Underage drinkers often use false identification to purchase alcohol or gain access into bars.
Introduction
Underage drinking statistics in the United States are alarming. Although consuming alcohol under the age of 21 is illegal, people aged 12 to 20 years drink 11% of all alcohol consumed in the United States, and more than 90% of this alcohol is consumed in the form of binge drinking (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2005). 1 Alcohol is also responsible for more than 4, 700 deaths and 185, 000 emergency room visits per year among underage youth. 2 Furthermore, recent research linked alcohol consumption among minors to a long list of adverse social and economic outcomes including future alcohol dependency and abuse (Hingston, Heeren, and Winter, 2006), poor academic performance (Carrell, Hoekstra, and West., 2011), reduced employment (Renna, 2008) , crime (Carpenter and Dobkin, 2010) , and risky sexual behavior (Waddell, 2012) .
In light of these findings, policy makers have proposed several regulations to reduce the incidence of underage drinking. Among many others, perhaps the most direct form of regulation targeted towards young adults in the United States is imposing a minimum legal drinking age (hereafter, MLDA). Since 1988, it is illegal for youths under age 21 to purchase or consume alcohol in the United States. The punishments for purchasing or consuming alcohol under the MLDA or selling alcohol to a minor varies considerably across states, but include fines, jail time, loss of a liquor license for retailers, and temporary license revocation for underage buyers. Minors who use false identification may also face additional punishment (Bellou and Bhatt, 2013) . However, it is clear that the MLDA or associated punishments does not entirely prevent underage drinking. Underage drinkers can access alcohol through a number of sources, including stealing, purchasing alcohol themselves using a false identification, obtaining it from stores that do not check for identification, and asking an older adult to purchase it on their behalf (Century Council, 2003) . Furthermore, retailers often disregard age requirements and sell alcohol to minors (Preusser, Williams, and Weinstein, 1994) .
In an attempt address these problems, recently, several states have introduced laws that provide incentives to retailers and bar owners who use electronic scanners to ensure that the customers is 21 years or older and that the identification is legitimate. 3 These incentives include an affirmative defense in prosecutions for sales to minors if the retailer can show that the scanner was used properly. 4 1 On average, underage drinkers consume more drinks per drinking occasion than adult drinkers (National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, 2004) . 2 See, for example, Center for Disease Control and Prevention (2008) and Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality (2012). 3 Electronic scanners read birthdate and other information digitally encoded on identification cards and help retailers to determine whether the identification is valid and the buyer is 21 years or older. 4 Affirmative defense is facts and arguments that, if true, will exonerate a defendant, even if all allegations in the For instance, section 7 of New York's ABC law provides retailers with an affirmative defense when properly using an ID scanner during the sale of alcohol to a minor. If a retailer inadvertently sells to a minor who provides a false identification and gets caught, then with the transaction record stored in an ID scanner, the retailer would be able to claim an affirmative defense. Without an ID scanner, the retailer may be found guilty of serving alcohol to a minor and depending on severity of the violation, may be forced to pay fines up to $10, 000, may loose its liquor license, and/or face jail time up to one year. 5 Alcohol compliance checks are the most widely used tool to identify licensed alcohol establishments that sell alcohol to underage youth. During a compliance check, law enforcement officials send underage youth into retail stores or bars to purchase alcohol with their own underage identification.
Using an electronic scanner to check whether the customer is 21 years or older appears to be a safe and relatively cheap way of passing a compliance check. 6 However, there are no data on the actual number of retail stores or bars that own and actively use an electronic scanner or the number of citations made for underage sales. 7 A priori, it is not clear whether the false ID laws with scanner provision (hereafter, FSP laws) would make have a meaningful impact on youth access or reduce underage alcohol consumption. For instance, the FSP laws may not affect underage drinking, if teens substitute towards other methods of obtaining alcohol, such as asking an older adult to purchase it on their behalf or obtaining it from retail stores that do not use electronic scanners. It is also possible that only few retailers actually use electronic scanners to avoid selling alcohol to minors. If this is the case, then the FSP laws should not affect youth access to alcohol in a meaningful way. Therefore, quantifying the impact of the FSP laws on underage alcohol consumption is important and would provide valuable insights to policymakers for shaping future alcohol control policies.
This paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of the effects of the FSP laws on underage complaint are true. 5 The highlighs of current New York Liquor Law is available at http://www.sla.ny.gov/handbook-for-retail-licenses. 6 Compared with the potential punishments that a retailer may face for inadvertently selling alcohol to minors, owning an electronic scanner is relatively cheap. An electronic scanner typically costs between $400 and $1,300
(www.idscanner.com). 7 Several recent news from the popular press report that use of the ID scanners is on the rise. For instance, Irvine (2003) reports that ID scanners are gaining popularity with liquor retailers, police officers, and bar owners nationwide as fake IDs get ever-more sophisticated and difficult to spot. On the other hand, a recent proposal to privatize liquor sales in Pennsylvania by Majority Leader Mike Turzai mandates the use of ID scanners with age verification software and increases the fine for selling to minors to $10000. The proposal is available online at http://www.pahousegop.com/Display/SiteFiles/109/OtherDocuments/000_LCB_PrivatizationSummary_7_8_11.pdf.
alcohol consumption trends using confidential data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1997 Cohort (NLSY97). In order to estimate the impact of this laws on underage alcohol consumption, I exploit the substantial variation in the implementation of these laws across different states. Using a difference-in-differences (DD) methodology, I find that the FSP laws significantly reduce underage drinking, including up to a 0.22 drink decrease in the average number of drinks consumed by underage youth per day. This result is robust to alternative model specifications. The impact of the FSP laws are more pronounced for 16 and 17 year olds. For this group, I find that these laws reduce probability of engaging in binge drinking up to 12 percentage points and the average number of drinks consumed per day by up to 0.32 drinks. I also extend the basic DD analysis and find that the impact of the FSP laws is concentrated in the short-run, which implies a learning behavior and shows that underage individuals substitute towards other methods of obtaining alcohol or can easily find alternative retailers that do not use electronic scanners.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a summary of the history of the FSP laws in the United States and discusses the relevant research. Section 3 presents the data and sets out the specifications for alternative empirical models. Section 4 presents the results and discusses the robustness of the main findings. Section 5 interprets the results, provides a discussion of policy implications, and concludes. Since the FSP laws are designed to control underage drinking, I restrict the sample to those respondents who were younger than 21 as of the interview date and were surveyed over the period
1998-2005.
A unique feature of the restricted version of the NLSY97 is that it contains information on respondents' state of residence, exact date of birth, and exact interview date for each survey year. I use this information to determine whether the respondent was younger than 21 and her state enforces a FSP law as of the interview date.
In order investigate the impact of the FSP laws on alcohol consumption among underage individuals, I consider five alternative indicators of alcohol consumption. Two of these indicators are measures of drinking participation, i.e., whether the respondent consumed alcohol over the past month and whether the respondent engaged in heavy (binge) drinking in the past month. 10 Two of the remaining indicators are measures of drinking episodes per month, i.e., the number of days that the respondent had at least one drink and the number of days that she had five or more drinks on the same occasion during the past month. The remaining indicator of alcohol consumption measures the intensity of drinking as the average number of drinks that the respondent consumed per day during the past month. 11 1 0 These binary variables are not observed directly. The respondents were asked the following questions: "During the last 30 days, on how many days did you have one or more drinks of an alcoholic beverage?" and "On how many days did you have five or more drinks on the same occasion during the past 30 days? By occasion we mean at the same time or within hours of each other". The alcohol participation variables for the corresponding questions are coded unity if the respondent reported consuming alcohol on at least one day during the past month and zero otherwise. 1 1 The respondents were asked the following question: "In the past 30 days, on the days you drank alcohol, about how I estimate the effect of the FSP laws in standard fixed-effects models for each alcohol consumption and alcohol consumption related outcome. The longitudinal nature of data enables me to control for unobserved individual fixed effects, as well as year and season effects, and state specific components related to alcohol consumption among underage young adults. This method is akin to the standard DD type model that exploits both temporal and spatial variation in FSP laws since each model is identified using within state variation in timing of the adoption of FSP law, controlling for differences across states that were not adopted the FSP law over the same time period. Specifically, I estimate the following DD model:
where i indexes individuals, s indexes states, m indexes months, and t indexes years. In this model, many drinks did you usually have?" In order to calculate the average number of drinks per day during a one month period, I multiply the number of days that the respondent drank alcohol with the average number of drinks that she had on those days and divide the result by 30. 1 2 In order to control for the exact age in days, for each respondent, I calculate the difference in days between their interview date and the 21st birthday (MLDA) and used this variable and its quadratic term as an indicator of age. Using actual age in years instead of this alternative measure does not significantly affect the results. Binary variables controlling for educational attainment include four categories: less than high school, high school, two year college, and four year college. Binary variables controlling for different income ranges include eight categories: household income is less than $20,000, $20,000-$40,000, $40,000-$60,000, $60,000-$80,000, $80,000-$100,000, $100,000-$120,000, more than $120,000, and household income is missing. Each outcome variable refers to the past month. Therefore, respondents who were interviewed within the first month after the policy change might have actually consumed alcohol before the policy change. To address this potential problem, the vector of individual-level controls also contains a dummy variable that is equal to one for respondents who were interviewed within the first month after the policy change. 1 3 Drivers under age 21 are subject to tougher drunk driving laws, which are also known as "zero tolerance" (ZT) laws.
In particular, it is illegal for drivers under age 21 to have measurable amounts of alcohol in their blood. In many states, BAC level is set to 0 or 0.02 for drivers under age 21. However, these laws are enacted between 1983 and 1998 and no state has changed its ZT law after July, 1998. The key identification assumption in Equation (1) is that, in the absence of the FSP laws, alcohol consumption among underage drinkers would have trended similarly between states which had enacted these laws and those which had not. One potential threat to this identification strategy is that the decision to pass a FSP law may reflect policy endogeneity. In particular, states that experienced relatively higher underage drinking rates might be more likely to adopt the FSP laws compared with those states with relatively lower underage drinking rates. However, Figure 2 clearly shows that these laws could not have been introduced as a reaction to increased underage drinking rates in the states that have passed these laws. As illustrated in this figure, trends in probability of consuming alcohol and engaging in binge drinking among underage individuals are fairly similar across states that passed FSP laws and those that did not prior to passage of these laws. Figure 3 presents a similar analysis for alternative indicators of alcohol consumption, i.e., number of drinking and binge drinking episodes per month, and confirms that prior to passage of the FSP laws, alcohol consumption trends among underage individuals were similar across the treatment and control states. 14 Furthermore, in order to address concerns of policy endogeneity formally, I extend the basic DD analysis in two ways. First, I
incorporate state-specific linear time trends (trend × µ s ) to Equation (1) by interacting a dummy for report unweighted DD estimates of the relationship between the FSP laws and the outcomes discussed above. 15 However, for the most general model specification, I also present the results from the sample weighed DD models in Appendix Table A2 . In general, results from the weighted and unweighted regressions are similar. this model suggest that the FSP law has a relatively small but statistically significant impact on several indicators of underage drinking behavior, except for the probability of drinking. In particular, the FSP law is associated with a 2.6 percentage point decrease in the probability of engaging in binge drinking, a 0.23 day decrease in the number of drinking days per month, a 0.15 day decrease in the number of binge drinking days per month, and a 0.13 drink decrease in the average number 1 5 In technical sampling report of the NLSY97, Moore, et al. (2000) argue that using NLSY97 weights to perform weighted least squares when doing regression analysis may lead to incorrect estimates. In correctly specified models, using sample weights may also increase the variance of estimates and lead to loss of efficiency (DuMouchel and Duncan, 1983).
Results

Full sample
of drinks consumed per day. The results from the second specification show that these estimates are robust to the inclusion of individual and state level controls. The third specification in Table   2 shows that inclusion of a lead term to regressions, which should pick up a potential pre-existing trend in underage drinking rates at the treatment states, does not have a considerable impact on the estimated effect of the FSP laws on several indicators of alcohol consumption among underage youth. Under this specification, the FSP law is associated with 3.7 percentage point decrease in the probability of engaging in binge drinking and a 0.22 drink decrease in the average number of drinks consumed per day. The last specification in Table 2 reports the results from the most general model, which also controls for the state-specific linear time trends.
The results from this model shows that the FSP law is associated with a 2.7 percentage point decrease in the probability of engaging in binge drinking. However, this effect is not significant at conventional significance levels. The effect of the FSP laws on remaining indicators of alcohol consumption is robust to the inclusion of statespecific linear time trends. In particular, results from the fourth specification in Table 2 suggest that underage individuals tend to decrease the average of drinks that they consume per day by 0.18 drinks in response to a FSP law. To further test the robustness of my estimates, in Appendix Table A3,   I report the results from a falsification test. If the treatment dummy is just picking up pre-existing differences between treatment and control states, then one expects to observe a similar impact of the FSP law on those who are 21 years or older. However, Table A3 shows that as expected, FSP laws have no significant impact on alcohol consumption behavior of those young adults who have legal access to alcohol. This result further confirms that the significant decrease in several indicators of alcohol consumption among underage drinkers is due to the FSP laws.
Alternative samples
In Table 3 , I investigate whether the effect of the FSP laws on alcohol consumption differs by gender.
The results suggest that the FSP law is associated with up to a 0.2 drink decrease in the average number of drinks consumed per day by underage males and underage females. Similarly, under the most general model, both males and females tend to reduce the number of days that they engage in binge drinking during the past month by up to 0.36 to 0.38 days, respectively. FSP laws do not have a significant impact on the remaining indicators of alcohol consumption for females. However, underage males tend to decrease the number of days that they consume alcohol per month by up to 0.9 days and their probability of engaging in binge drinking by up to 4.1 percentage points in response to a FSP law. In many states, young adults who are 16 years and older are allowed to hold a driver's licence, which is a major form of identification. Table 4 shows that drinking habits of 16-17 year olds are significantly changed due to the introduction of the FSP laws. The results from alternative models imply that for this age group, the FSP law is associated with up to a 8 percentage point decrease in the probability of drinking, a 12 percentage point decrease in the probability of engaging in binge drinking, a 0.63 day decrease in the number of drinking days during the past month, and a 0.32 drink decrease in the average number of drinks consumed per day. In general, these estimates are highly significant and robust to the inclusion of individual and state level controls, lead term, and state-specific time trends.
Compared with those who are relatively younger, 18-20 year olds are more likely to know somebody who is 21 or older and therefore, can buy them alcohol. Moreover, compared with those relatively younger, retailers and bar owners may be less likely to ask identification from 18-20 year olds since they may look older than 21. If this is the case, then one would expect to find that the introduction of the FSP laws does not have significant impact on drinking habits of 18-20 year olds. As expected, Table 4 show that under alternative model specifications, the effect of the FSP laws on different indicators of alcohol consumption among this age group is statistically insignificant.
Dynamic effects
In Table 5 , I investigate dynamic responses in youth drinking behavior to adoption of FSP laws. 16 The estimates in this table are from the most general DD model which instead of the treatment dummy, contains binary indicators for the years leading up to and after a state introduces a FSP law. For the full sample, the coefficient estimates on years before the policy change are small and not statistically significant at conventional significance levels, which imply that states that imposed a FSP law did not introduce this policy as a response to upsurges in teen alcohol consumption. On the other hand, Table 5 shows a significant drop in average alcohol consumption in the first two years immediately following policy adoption. Estimates for three to six years since adoption are uniformly negative, though not statistically significant. A similar result is also observed for underage males, whereas the short-run impact of the FSP laws of drinking behavior of underage females is negative but not significant. One possible explanation for this result is that over time, underage drinkers learn the new policy and find alternative ways to obtain alcohol such as purchasing it from retailers that do not use electronic scanners or asking an older adult to purchase it on their behalf. 17 law and vertical ID law, and a dummy variable which is equal to one for the states with Democratic governors at a given year. 18 A primary shortcoming of beer consumption data is that they are only reported on an annual basis. Therefore, I code the FSP laws according to the fraction of the year they are in effect for each state, resulting in less precision. However, since I consider an extended time period, I was able to use the additional variation from the two late adopter states, i.e., Nebraska and Utah. The first column of Table 6 shows that overall beer consumption per capita decreases by 1 7 Results from the dynamic DD analysis should be interpreted with caution due to the limitations of data. For instance, the only variation in the "7 plus years after" category comes from New York (the first state to adopt the FSP laws). 1 8 Data on share of population age 15-19, percent of female, white, black, and hispanic population, percent of population with a high school, college, and graduate degrees, and poverty rate come from the Census Bureau.
Spillover effects
1.9% due to the FSP laws. Furthermore, this effect is highly significant.
If FSP laws significantly reduce binge drinking among underage youth, one might expect to observe a decrease in the number of underage youth arrested for public drunkenness. In order to investigate the relationship between the FSP laws and the number of arrests for public drunkenness, I use data from FBI's National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS). These data provide the most detailed information on various types of crime in the United States and include information on arrests for public drunkenness for 32 states for 2000-2010. 19 For this analysis, I consider arrests of underage youth and calculate the total number of arrests for public drunkenness for this group for each month. 20 I report the results from a Poisson regression estimated with a full set of control variables, and state, year, and month fixed effects in the second column of Table 6 . The estimated impact of the FSP laws on the number of underage youth arrested for public drunkenness is negative and highly significant. In particular, I find that the FSP law is associated with 19.3% fewer arrests for public drunkenness (This follows from the fact that 1 − exp(−0.215) = 0.193). These results provide further complementary evidence that the FSP laws are associated with considerable reductions in underage alcohol consumption.
Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the effect of the FSP laws on alternative indicators of alcohol consumption among underage youth using a restricted version of the NLSY97 which contains information on the state of residence and exact birth date of the respondents. To my best knowledge, this is the first paper to provide a comprehensive analysis of the effects of these laws. Using DD models, I document that the FSP laws significantly reduce underage drinking, including up to a 0.22 drink decrease in the average number of drinks consumed by underage individuals per day. Compared with other age groups, the effect of the FSP laws are more pronounced for 16 and 17 year olds. For this group, I
find that these laws reduce the average number of drinks consumed per day by up to 0.32 drinks. I also extend the basic DD analysis and find that the impact of the FSP laws is concentrated in the short-run, which implies that underage youth substitute towards other methods of obtaining alcohol.
Given the existing literature that relates alcohol consumption among minors to a long list of ad- 1 9 NIBRS does not contain information on arrests for public drunkness for some states with FSP laws such as New
York, North Carolina, Pennsylavinia, and Oregon. 2 0 The total number of arrests for public drunkenness is not available for each month for each state during 2000-2010 since states adopted NIBRS gradually.
verse social and economic outcomes such as mortality, crime, and academic performance, the positive effect of the FSP laws in reducing underage drinking would suggest that these laws could have a considerable positive impact on these outcomes. For instance, prior work has found that a 10% increase in drinking days increases the probability of arrest by about 1 percent (Carpenter and Dobkin, 2010). Therefore, given my estimate that the FSP law decreases drinking days by up to 0.48 days (a 17.6% reduction from the mean), the FSP law would also decrease the probability of arrest among minors up to 1.76%. Carpenter and Dobkin (2009) document that a 10% increase in the number of drinking days for young adults results in a 4.3% increase in mortality, primarily due to motor vehicle accidents, alcohol-related deaths, and suicides. This finding implies that FSP law would decrease alcohol related mortality among minors by up to 7.57%. In a recent paper, Balsa, Giuliano, and French (2011) examine the effects of alcohol use on high school students' quality of learning and find that an increase of one day per month in drinking frequency reduces GPA by 0.005 points. Hence, according to my estimates, the FSP law would lead to up to a 0.0024 point increase in average high school student's GPA. However, although these rough estimates provide some evidence on the positive impact of the FSP lawn on several social and economic outcomes,further research is needed to establish such relationships.
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